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Abstract
Update: In April 1991, Special 301 requires the U.S. Administration again to identify any
“priority foreign countries” that fail to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. nationals who rely upon intellec-
tual property protection. The time is ripe, then, to re view the Administration’s use of these tools
to seek to enhance worldwide protection of intellectual property rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Earlier in this Journal, we described two intellectual prop-
erty provisions of the 1988 trade legislation.' To enhance pro-
tection by foreign governments of intellectual property rights,
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the
"1988 Trade Act") 2 established principal negotiating objec-
tives for intellectual property in the Uruguay Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations,- and created Special 301.'
The Uruguay Round negotiations were originally sched-
uled to conclude in December 1990. In April 1991, Special
301 requires the U.S. Administration again to identify any
"priority foreign countries" 5 that fail to provide adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair
and equitable market access to U.S. nationals who rely upon
* Mrs. Bello is a partner in Sidley & Austin's Washington, D.C. office, focusing
on international trade regulation. She previously served as General Counsel to the
U.S. Trade Representative, among other positions in the Executive Branch.
** Mr. Holmer is a partner in Sidley & Austin's Washington, D.C. office, focus-
ing on international trade regulation. He previously served as Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative (1987-1989) and General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative
(1985-1987), among other government positions.
1. Bello & Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance,
13 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 259 (1989-1990).
2. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of
19 U.S.C.).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(10) (1988). The Uruguay Round negotiations were
launched in 1986 under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GAIT"), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187. The negotiations were intended to strengthen the existing GATT
rules and to extend GATT to the "frontier" areas of intellectual property protection,
services, and investment. The 1988 Trade Act facilitated negotiations by making a
bill to implement their outcome eligible (under certain conditions) for congressional
consideration under "fast track" procedures, ensuring timely votes by the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate and precluding unraveling amend-
ments. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
5. Id. § 2242(a)(2).
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intellectual property protection. The time is ripe, then, to re-
view the Administration's use of these tools to seek to enhance
worldwide protection of intellectual property rights.
I. SPECIAL 301
A. The Requirements of Special 301
As previously explained in detail,6 the Special 301 provi-
sions of the 1988 Trade Act require the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (the "USTR") 7 to identify annually "pri-
ority foreign countries" (1) whose failure to protect intellectual
property is the most onerous and has the greatest adverse im-
pact on U.S. products; and (2) that are not entering into good
faith negotiations or making significant progress in negotia-
tions (multilateral and bilateral) to provide adequate and effec-
tive protection of intellectual property rights.8 Such identifica-
tion normally triggers an investigation of such country's intel-
lectual property practices, 9 which may lead to retaliation
against such country if it refuses to reform its practices satisfac-
torily.'0
B. Implementation of Special 301
1. 1989 Activity
In its first implementation of Special 301 in May 1989, the
USTR declined to identify any priority foreign countries. In-
stead, it created a Watch List and Priority Watch List of prob-
lem countries.'1 It named eight countries to the Priority
Watch List: Brazil, India, Mexico, the People's Republic of
6. Bello & Holmer, supra note 1, at 261-63.
7. Operating within the Executive Office of the U.S. President, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (the "USTR") is the Executive Branch agency responsible
for developing and coordinating the trade policy of the United States. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2271(c) (1988); Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273; Exec. Order No.
12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1) (1988).
9. Id. § 2412(b)(2).
10. Retaliation is not required in such cases, unless the country has breached an
agreement with the United States. Id. § 2411.
11. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: "Special 301 " on Intellec-
tual Property 1 (May 25, 1989), reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 718
(May 31, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinaf-
ter Fact Sheet].
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China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.12
The USTR named seventeen countries to the Watch List: Ar-
gentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.' 3
In taking this creative approach, the USTR sought to im-
plement Special 301 in a manner that would increase prospects
for a successful outcome in the Uruguay Round negotiations
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). The
strategy was to jump-start the multilateral TRIPs talks in Ge-
neva through a credible but distant threat of possible U.S. uni-
lateral action.
The USTR undertook a self-imposed review of progress in
intellectual property negotiations with Watch List and Priority
Watch List countris in November 1989.14 It moved three
countries-Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Taiwan-from the
Priority Watch List to the Watch List, based on "steady"'15 or
"substantial"' 6 progress. Otherwise, the Watch List and Prior-
ity Watch List remained unchanged.
The USTR concluded its interim review with a commit-
ment to continue to press for improvements from all twenty-
five countries. It stressed it would pay particular attention to
the contributions of those countries and their positions in the
Uruguay Round TRIPs negotiations. 7
2. 1990 Activity
In the spring of 1990, the USTR announced its continua-
tion of the Watch List and Priority Watch List. Portugal and
Mexico were removed from the lists, but the other twenty-
three countries remained.' It again declined to identify any
"priority foreign countries."19
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
14. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Hills Announces Results of Special 301
Review (Nov. 1, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Hills Announces Results of Special 301
Review (Apr. 27, 1990) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
19. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Special 301" on Intellectual Property
(Apr. 27, 1990) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
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The USTR did not issue a second interim report, which
would have occurred just five weeks before the scheduled con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round.
II. THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPs NEGOTIATIONS
A. Uruguay Round Milestones
1. Launching the Round
In spearheading the launch of the Uruguay Round in Sep-
tember 1986, a key objective of the United States was to ex-
tend the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
"GATIT") to provide for the protection of intellectual property
rights. The United States sought a multilateral agreement that
would establish adequate substantive and enforcement stan-
dards, as well as effective dispute settlement procedures and
remedies.2 0 For example, while the Berne Convention covered
various intellectual property issues,21 it was not comprehensive
or adequate. The United States succeeded in securing the
agreement of its trading partners to make TRIPs one of the
negotiating groups. 2
From the outset, however, it was clear that the TRIPs ne-
gotiations would be difficult. The subject was substantively
complex and technical, and generally unfamiliar to many trade
experts. It involved new agencies within many government bu-
reaucracies. Even among developed countries, there were
strong differences of view. 23 Finally, many developing coun-
tries opposed stronger, more comprehensive protection of in-
tellectual property rights. While developed countries, led by
the United States, decried piracy and the threat to future inno-
vation and creativity, some developing countries openly cham-
pioned the short-term benefits of cheaper and better products
for their poorer consumers.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(10) (1988).
21. E.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1986, reprinted in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO
THE BERNE CONVENTION (1978).
22. GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round 7 (Sept. 20, 1986) (copy
on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
23. For example, Canada and Japan were placed on the Special 301 Watch List.
Fact Sheet, supra note 11, at 3, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May
31, 1989).
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2. Mid-Term Review
The mid-term review of progress in the Round, held in
Montreal in December 1988, reflected the TRIPs difficulties.
While Ministers reached satisfactory accords in eleven negoti-
ating groups, four-including TRIPs24 -c6uld not then be re-
solved. Consequently, a special GAT session was convened
in April 1989, at which negotiating plans for TRIPs and the
other three problem areas were finally agreed upon.25
B. Scheduled Conclusion
The entire Round, including the TRIPs negotiations, was
scheduled to conclude at a ministerial meeting in Brussels De-
cember 3-7, 1990. However, talks collapsed in all negotiating
groups largely due to intransigence by the European Commu-
nities in the agriculture negotiating group.26
As of the writing of this update article2 7 talks are sched-
uled to be resumed in Geneva. Even if the impasse in agricul-
ture is overcome, many disagreements still plague the TRIPs
(and other) negotiations, the text of which is riddled with
bracketed language. When talks resume, negotiators will be
besieged as well with a fast-looming deadline: authority for
U.S. implementing legislation to be considered under "fast
track" procedures 28 effectively expired March 1, 1991. It auto-
matically will be restored for two years in response to the Pres-
ident's request, provided neither house of the U.S. Congress
disapproves his request prior to May 31, 1991.29
III. OUTLOOK FOR SPECIAL 301 AND THE URUGUAY
ROUND TRIPs TALKS
The outcome in the Uruguay Round TRIPs negotiations
24. The other three problem areas were agriculture, safeguards, and textiles.
GATT Secretariat, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Trade Negotiations Committee,
Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level (Dec. 9, 1988) (restricted docu-
ment).
25. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, GATT Uruguay Round Mid-Term
Agreements Achieved (Apr. 8, 1989).
26. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the President (Dec.
7, 1990).
27. January 1991.
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing "fast track" procedures).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988); id. § 2191.
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and the outlook for future implementation of Special 301 are
inextricably intertwined. Our earlier Article in this Journal con-
cluded:
However, the continued ability to keep nearly everyone
happy concerning intellectual property protection depends
on the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round by the
end of 1990. If a satisfactory agreement on intellectual
property is not achieved in 1990, the 'USTR will be hard
pressed by both the Congress and the private sector to
identify priority foreign countries in the application of Spe-
cial 301 in 1991 and beyond. On the other hand, if a gener-
ally satisfactory agreement is achieved but Special 301 is
nonetheless retained and implemented in a manner incon-
sistent with that agreement, the international community's
response will be swift and harsh.3 °
That view remains valid today, just as the outcome of the
TRIPs negotiations today remains uncertain. If the TRIPs dis-
agreements are resolved, the text satisfactory, and the U.S.
Congress persuaded to implement the Round's results, Special
301 could be repealed through the U.S. implementing legisla-
tion considered under the "fast track" procedures. Short of its
repeal, it could be modified to confer on the USTR essentially
a responsibility to monitor and report to the U.S. Congress on
compliance with the TRIPs agreement. Alternatively, Special
301 could be left unchanged, permitting the USTR to continue
its Watch List/Priority Watch List identifications if appropri-
ate, and to identify no "priority foreign countries" if appropri-
ate.
However, if the Uruguay Round were not concluded, or if
the U.S. Congress disapproved the President's implementing
legislation, the USTR would be expected to identify "priority
foreign countries" and to press even harder in bilateral negoti-
ations with countries on the Priority Watch List in particular.3'
Moreover, the U.S. Congress could be expected to consider
30. Bello & Holmer, supra note 1, at 275.
31. While not under Special 301, the USTR initiated an investigation under ge-
neric section 301 procedures on December 21, 1990 of Thai copyright practices, and
on March 15, 1991, of Thailand's failure to provide pharmaceutical patent protec-
tion. 56 Fed. Reg. 292, 11,815 (USTR 1991) (initiation). The investigation responds
to a petition filed by the International Intellectual Property Alliance, the Motion Pic-
ture Export Association of America, and the Recording Industry Association of
America.
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bills to toughen up Special 301, perhaps seeking to require the
USTR to identify at least a minimum number of priority for-
eign countries annually absent extraordinary or compelling
circumstances. In addition, Congress conceivably could
broaden the "requirement" for retaliation in certain section
301 investigations to include intellectual property cases.5 2
Even if the TRIPs negotiations largely succeed, however,
some U.S. firms and trade associations may press the USTR for
relief from lax protection of intellectual property during any
transition or phase-in period to coax reluctant developing
countries to approve.
Therefore, the outlook-whether for improved interna-
tional protection, or increased trade tension as a result of ag-
gressive national border measures--depends on how satisfac-
tory the TRIPs text proves to be, whether the U.S. Administra-
tion enters into Uruguay Round agreements, and whether the
U.S. Congress approves such agreements.
32. This requirement is subject to a number of qualifications. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a)(2) (1988).
